Trumping Development: Selective Delinking and Coercive Governmentality in US–Africa Relations by Owusu, Francis et al.
Community and Regional Planning Publications Community and Regional Planning 
Fall 2019 
Trumping Development: Selective Delinking and Coercive 
Governmentality in US–Africa Relations 
Francis Owusu 
Iowa State University, fowusu@iastate.edu 
Ricardo Reboredo 
Trinity College Dublin, Ireland 
Padraig Carmody 
Trinity College Dublin, Ireland 
Follow this and additional works at: https://lib.dr.iastate.edu/communityplanning_pubs 
 Part of the African Languages and Societies Commons, American Politics Commons, International 
Economics Commons, International Relations Commons, Political Economy Commons, and the Urban, 
Community and Regional Planning Commons 
The complete bibliographic information for this item can be found at https://lib.dr.iastate.edu/
communityplanning_pubs/40. For information on how to cite this item, please visit 
http://lib.dr.iastate.edu/howtocite.html. 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Community and Regional Planning at Iowa State 
University Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Community and Regional Planning Publications 
by an authorized administrator of Iowa State University Digital Repository. For more information, please contact 
digirep@iastate.edu. 
Trumping Development: Selective Delinking and Coercive Governmentality in 
US–Africa Relations 
Abstract 
Globalization is one of the most important socioeconomic processes of recent decades, but it has 
elicited a reactionary backlash in some countries, leading to calls for reform. President Trump's rise to 
power in the United States and his determination to rewrite his country's involvement in globalization have 
brought substantial changes to foreign policy, including the US–Africa relationship. His administration's 
policies appear undeveloped, but we can determine distinct trends and tendencies. This article examines 
the effects of these policies on Africa to argue that they go beyond a return to the benign neglect shown 
by many US presidents before the Clinton and George W. Bush administrations, to include a malign 
governmental gaze, exemplifying a retreat from US global hegemony through selective delinking in aid, 
and manifesting economic and security interests in Africa in particularly detrimental ways. 
Disciplines 
African Languages and Societies | American Politics | International Economics | International Relations | 
Political Economy | Urban, Community and Regional Planning 
Comments 
This article is published as Francis Owusu, Ricardo Reboredo and Pádraig Carmody, Trumping 
Development: Selective Delinking and Coercive Governmentality in US–Africa Relations., Africa Today Fall 
2019, 66(1)2-27. DOI: 10.2979/africatoday.66.1.01. Posted with permission. 
This article is available at Iowa State University Digital Repository: https://lib.dr.iastate.edu/
communityplanning_pubs/40 
One of the main channels 
through which the Trump 
administration could 
directly affect development 
outcomes in African 
countries is through trade 
relations.
Africa Today Vol. 66, No. 1 • Copyright © The Trustees of Indiana University • DOI: 10.2979/africatoday.66.1.01
Trumping Development: 
Selective Delinking and Coercive 
Governmentality in US–Africa 
Relations 
Francis Owusu, Ricardo Reboredo,  
Pádraig Carmody
Globalization is one of the most important socioeconomic 
processes of recent decades, but it has elicited a reaction-
ary backlash in some countries, leading to calls for reform. 
President Trump’s rise to power in the United States and his 
determination to rewrite his country’s involvement in global-
ization have brought substantial changes to foreign policy, 
including the US–Africa relationship. His administration’s 
policies appear undeveloped, but we can determine distinct 
trends and tendencies. This article examines the effects of 
these policies on Africa to argue that they go beyond a return 
to the benign neglect shown by many US presidents before 
the Clinton and George W. Bush administrations, to include 
a malign governmental gaze, exemplifying a retreat from 
US global hegemony through selective delinking in aid, and 
manifesting economic and security interests in Africa in par-
ticularly detrimental ways.
Introduction
Globalization—often defined as the increasing interconnectedness of the 
different parts of the world, involving reductions of barriers to exchange and 
the movement of ideas, goods, people, money, and so forth—is presented by 
advocates as a win–win process for all involved (Bhagwati 2007). However, 
it has attracted criticism, with opponents pointing to its failure to deliver 
to much of the world’s population the prosperity it promised (Selwyn 2017).
Beginning in 2008, the North Atlantic financial crisis helped galva-
nize opposition to globalization in many Western countries, giving rise, for 
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example, to the Occupy Movement, which began in the United States in 
2011. Politicians in some countries seized on a general discontent with neo-
liberal globalization, turning these sentiments into electoral victories, with a 
promise to reconfigure the process. A variety of contributory factors were in 
play, but Britain’s vote to leave the European Union (Brexit) and the election 
of Donald Trump in the United States are examples of this. These develop-
ments have effects and implications for global development and international 
relations. In particular, the Trump administration follows a so-called America 
First foreign policy, disengaging from some global commitments, including 
to Africa, where, as Trump has tweeted, “Every penny of the $7 billion going 
to Africa as per Obama will be stolen” (@realDonaldTrump July 1, 2013). He 
has reportedly spoken of Africa as “shithole countries” (Mindlock 2018).1
This article interrogates the Trump administration’s African agenda with 
a focus on US–Africa trade relations, development aid, foreign direct invest-
ments (FDI), security and terrorism concerns, and climate change. Additionally, 
we explore whether US competitors, such as China and the United Kingdom, 
will look to strengthen their relationships in Africa, given relative US disen-
gagement. The Trump presidency is highly unusual in many regards, but in 
engagement with African states, its agenda is partly a reversion to the pre-Clin-
ton policy of neglect and disengagement when perceived US interests are not at 
stake (Adibe 2013; Omotosho 2013), combined with coercive governmentality2 
when they are—which we characterize as malignancy combined with neglect, 
or malign neglect. Henry Shue (1980) has written about the so-called holocaust 
of neglect in the Global South by the United States, which continues under 
Trump; however America First, while attempting to reassert the US’s lead-
ing role in the world, is paradoxically a retreat from global hegemony, which 
cannot be based on economic and military force alone (Agnew 2017).
The next section explores Trump’s attempt to appropriate and rede-
fine the alter-globalization agenda. This is followed by the discussion of the 
history of previous US–Africa relations and the implications of the Trump 
administration’s policy for development on the continent. We then explore 
this by sectors and examine whether and how US competitors might fill the 
gap. The final section provides a summary and a conclusion.
Trump and the Redefinition of Alter-Globalization
To conceptualize the Trump administration’s foreign policy, it is important 
to distinguish between anti-globalization and alter-globalization: the former 
seeks to reverse globalizing trends, through reversion to greater national 
sovereignty and more local or national economic reliance; the latter, best 
described as counterhegemonic, seeks to replace the dominant global regime 
“with one that maximizes democratic political control and makes the equi-
table development of human capabilities and environmental stewardship 
its priorities” (Evans 2008, 272). Thus, alter-globalizationists do not oppose 
the process per se, but oppose one particular type, neoliberal economic 
FR
a
N
C
Is O
w
U
sU
, R
IC
a
R
D
O
 R
eb
O
R
eD
O
, Pá
D
R
a
Ig
 C
a
R
m
O
D
y
5
africa
To
D
A
y 66(1)
globalization, and not others, such as, for some of them, the global spread of 
human rights (Ritzer and Dean 2015, 431).
As Joseph Stiglitz (2016) argues, much of the early opposition to 
globalization took the form of alter-globalization and came from develop-
ing countries. Since the 2008 global economic crisis, dissent has spread to 
a large share of the populations in Europe and the United States, but this 
mainstreaming of alter-globalization has taken a nationalist, populist, and 
reactionary character. Politicians in many of these countries have seized 
on the general discontent with globalization to win electoral victories. One 
could point to rising economic nationalism in the Western world (e.g., US 
withdrawal from the Trans-Pacific Partnership and the trade war with China) 
and the questioning of benefits of political integration (e.g., the Brexit vote in 
the UK) and the backlash against immigration and the desire to build walls 
as examples of such efforts. While many initially argued that Trump was 
anti-neoliberal (Fraser 2017) by virtue of his promises to increase tariff pro-
tection of American industry and clamp down on corporate offshoring, the 
reality might be better characterized as promotion of “neoliberalism in one 
country” (Carmody 2017). Some have noted the irony that President Trump, 
allegedly a multibillionaire, claims to represent the working class (Roy 2017). 
In many ways, therefore, the US position under the Trump administration 
is not antiglobalization but a particular form of alter-globalization, driven 
by the desire to rewrite the rules of the game by restricting trade when it 
directly hurts the United States, clamping down on immigration, and reduc-
ing its commitment to the global order. In a way, Trump is trying to create 
a new class compromise in the United States and a new spatial fix globally 
(Harvey 1982) to US relative economic decline based on a retraction of over-
seas commitments and continued overseas market opening. Trump seeks to 
insulate the country from the impacts of the free market through economic 
protectionism and to “keep the world outside out” through heightened 
immigration restriction, yet at the same time, he continues to promote 
external economic liberalization to open up markets around the world for 
American exports—a strategy reminiscent of China’s (Lim 2010).
There has been substantial and ongoing media coverage of the implica-
tions of these events for the United States and Europe, but far less has been 
written about the impacts on the developing world and on Africa in particu-
lar. How has Trump’s ascension to power affected US–Africa relations and 
development on the continent? We here engage these issues in the context 
of Africa to identify the main trends and effects. 
US–Africa Relations and Impacts of the Trump Administration 
Delinking as a concept is often associated with dependency theory (Amin 
and Wolfers 1990), but arguably the Trump administration is pursuing a 
policy of selective delinking in its international relations, reflective of the 
dialectics of globalization. Trumpism represents a partial and reactionary 
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countermovement to marketization (Polanyi 1944). This selective delinking 
has taken a variety of channels, including trade, investment (attempting to 
get American corporations to reshore production operations), and aid. For 
instance, the administration’s tariffs on steel and aluminum products from 
abroad can be seen as a selective delinking from international trade norms 
and rules. This intent in relation to Africa is significant and was signaled 
early on.
Before the recent recognition of Africa’s role in the global realign-
ment in politics, trade, and international cooperation (Carmody 2016), the 
continent did not feature much in global politics, and the US foreign-policy 
view of the continent was focused on benign neglect, at best (Adibe 2014; 
Omotosho 2013). With a few exceptions, the United States showed a general 
lack of interest in the continent in most of the pre–World War II era (Waters 
2009). When the US did engage with Africa after World War II, its policy 
involved engaging or disengaging with individual African countries, based 
on its national interest, mostly defined in terms of counteracting the Soviet 
Union’s attempt to gain influence in the region (Keller 2006). US interest 
in Africa declined further with the coming to power of President Ronald 
Reagan (1981–89), except where perceived US interests were threatened, as 
in southern Africa in particular (Adibe 2014; Shubin 2008). George H. W. 
Bush’s administration (1989–93) continued a benign neglect approach, with 
Waters arguing, “Africa was very much an afterthought for his administra-
tion” (2009, lxvi).
The US–Africa relationship began to see serious and sustained engage-
ment with the Clinton administration and it subsequently deepened, with 
significant bipartisan support. The Clinton, Bush, and Obama administra-
tions saw a remarkable continuity in both the Congress and the White House 
on the US agenda in Africa. Each of these presidents launched a major flag-
ship program for the continent—including Clinton’s trade-focused African 
Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), Bush’s health-focused President’s 
Emergency Program for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR), and Obama’s infrastructure-
focused Power Africa, which is now under threat from budget cuts (Mama 
2017). In addition, George W. Bush tried to restructure US foreign aid by 
creating the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCA), which supported 
African governments that showed specific commitments to improvements 
in governance, democracy, and human rights (Owusu 2007), though, in 
practice, US geostrategic allies have been the ones most supported, and the 
MCA was heavily neoliberal in orientation (Soederberg 2004). The election of 
Donald Trump signaled a radical break with this consensus, with important 
implications for both US–Africa relations and development on the continent. 
Given the deepening pre-Trump US–Africa relationship, many were 
surprised when the new president’s transition team indicated possible dis-
engagement from the continent when it sent a set of probing questions 
to the State Department, including: “With so much corruption in Africa, 
how much of our funding is stolen?” “We’ve been fighting al-Shabaab for a 
decade; why haven’t we won?” “How does U.S. business compete with other 
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nations in Africa? Are we losing out to the Chinese?” “Why should the U.S. 
continue the Africa Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), which provides 
massive support to corrupt African regimes?” Some lauded these questions 
as appropriate, given that US aid to Africa is susceptible to corruption and 
waste (Mariam 2017), but others, such as McCormick (2017), pointed to 
the confrontationality and dismissiveness of the questions as reflecting the 
administration’s real intentions toward Africa.
In terms of policy, the Trump administration has shown “almost zero 
interest in Africa” (Kim Elliot, quoted in Wroughton 2017) until recently. 
A four-country, security-focused visit by Rex Tillerson, Secretary of State, 
to Africa early in 2018 was seen by some as an attempt to mend relations, 
though the disrespect with which Trump treats the continent was evi-
denced by his firing of Tillerson during his visit (Kazeem and Dahir 2018). 
However, on December 13, 2018, John Bolton, then National Security 
Advisor, announced the administration’s new Africa policy in a speech at 
the Heritage Foundation. He laid out a framework for US–Africa relations 
that would be based on narrow bilateral relationships, trade and investment, 
security, and the efficient use of American aid. More of a general philosophy 
than a specific pronouncement, this policy was originally slated for public 
release, but has since been classified (Gass 2019). Of utmost importance to 
the strategy is Prosper Africa, a new initiative, that will attempt to open 
markets for US goods and services, improve the continent’s business climate, 
and grow African middle classes (White House 2018a). Its details have yet to 
be revealed, but much of Bolton’s speech was aimed at national competitors, 
specifically China. Bolton stated:
China uses bribes, opaque agreements, and the strategic use 
of debt to hold states in Africa captive to Beijing’s wishes and 
demands. Its investment ventures are riddled with corruption, 
and do not meet the same environmental or ethical standards 
as U.S. developmental programs. (White House 2018a)
Bolton characterized Chinese engagement with the continent as predatory 
and claimed, “China is now poised to take over Zambia’s national power 
and utility company in order to collect on Zambia’s financial obligations” 
(this was later disputed by the Zambian Office of the Presidency). Analyzing 
these developments alongside changes to US aid and investment agencies, 
we can now begin to piece together the administration’s view of the US–
Africa relationship.
Us-africa Trade Relations
One of the main channels through which the Trump administration could 
directly affect development outcomes in African countries is through trade 
relations. African economies remain highly dependent on primary resource 
extraction and exports (Bond 2006), though most countries on the continent 
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remain commodity importers, given the dependence of many on oil and gas 
imports. With fragmented intracontinental markets, high transaction costs, 
and lack of regional integration, Africa is far more dependent on overseas 
trade than are other continents. Intra-African trade accounts for roughly 20 
percent of the continent’s total foreign trade (Kohnert 2018). A decade of 
Africa Rising narratives in popular media has obscured the fact that struc-
tural transformation, as expressed through deepening diversification, higher 
value-added exports, and the creation of high labor-productivity sectors, has 
not happened on most of the continent: instead, the true engines of economic 
growth have been a combination of high commodity prices, debt relief, and 
a glut of primary-sector foreign investment (Taylor 2016).
Since the turn of the millennium, US–Africa trade has largely been 
expressed under AGOA, which was well received in both houses of Congress: 
its 2015 renewal was sponsored by a nearly equal number of Republicans 
and Democrats and passed nearly unanimously in the Senate, and it does 
not expire until 2025. Built on previous US trade policies, it was designed 
to stimulate manufacturing growth by providing certain African countries 
with tariff-free access to US markets. Today, it provides duty-free access to 
the United States for approximately 6,800 product lines from forty countries 
in sub-Saharan Africa. It is not a negotiated agreement between parties, but 
it involves concessions offered to African countries by the United States, to 
which access is negotiated bilaterally. For instance, South Africa, to continue 
benefitting from AGOA, had to accommodate US interests and establish 
a quota agreement with regard to its poultry exports (CNBC Africa 2018).
As per the AGOA guidelines, eligibility requirements are reviewed 
annually, and beneficiary status can be granted or rescinded at the US 
president’s discretion. Beneficiary countries have no recourse for dispute 
settlement—which differentiates AGOA’s nonreciprocal preferences from 
those of other widely used agreements, such as the WTO General System of 
Preferences. Given this, AGOA status can be used as leverage by the Trump 
Administration.
AGOA, while it has largely failed to create broad-based growth through-
out the continent due to sparse usage, has become a useful tool for attracting 
manufacturing sector investment in countries such as Ethiopia and South 
Africa (interview with Dr. Cobus van Staden, Johannesburg, March 2018). 
Since its implementation in 2000, AGOA has stimulated Africa–US trade 
valued at approximately US$36 billion annually, has become the main chan-
nel of US–African trade, with more than 70 percent of US imports from 
AGOA-eligible countries occurring through the program (Bonarriva 2014), and 
has helped create more than 300,000 jobs in Africa (Owusu and Otiso 2018). 
AGOA benefits the US and has been used to promote globalizing norms, 
such as liberal markets and democratic reforms in Africa, as well as to open 
up markets for US goods and services. Indeed, according to the Office of the 
United States Trade Representative (USTR), to be eligible for AGOA, countries 
must establish a market-based economy, “eliminate barriers to U.S. trade and 
investment,” and address a host of other conditionalities (USTR 2018a).
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Oil, for most of its existence, has been the main product entering 
the United States duty free under AGOA, thereby replicating the colonial 
structure of trade relations; however, the US trade deficit with the forty 
AGOA countries fell from $64 billion in 2008 to only $7.9 billion in 2017, 
largely as a result of increased shale-oil production domestically (Raji 2018). 
For many non-oil-exporting countries, textiles and apparel have been the 
main exports, with other sectors experiencing only a lackluster response 
(International Trade Administration 2016). Kenya, Lesotho, Mauritius, and 
Madagascar have established themselves as the leading exporters of textiles 
and apparel under the act, accounting for nearly 90 percent of AGOA apparel 
exports in 2017.
AGOA, though it supports approximately 120,000 export-related jobs 
within the United States (Reboredo 2017), has been criticized as supporting 
foreign entrepreneurs and firms, mostly of Chinese origin, who use it as a 
back door to get their goods to the United States (Reboredo 2017; Rotunno, 
Vézina, and Wang 2013). This argument ignores the fact that while the firms 
may be foreign, the employees are overwhelmingly locals from the countries 
where production is based, and African states may aim to use this investment 
to precipitate skills and technology transfers and develop local industries.
Despite Trump’s protectionist tendencies and his promises to rene-
gotiate US trade agreements in the spirit of America First, he has not yet 
spoken publicly about AGOA. Thus far, he has shown no interest in chal-
lenging AGOA, probably because it enjoys bipartisan congressional support, 
and he is focused on trade relations with China. In fact, a recent statement 
released by the Office of the United States Trade Representative notes that 
the administration is seeking to “build on AGOA’s success by strengthening 
bilateral trade relationships in sub-Saharan Africa with the goal of estab-
lishing a free trade agreement that could serve as a model for developing 
countries” (USTR 2018b).3 However, despite this discursive continuity, the 
Trump administration recently suspended duty-free treatment of clothing 
imports from Rwanda when the country raised duties on imported (used) 
apparel and footwear to stimulate domestic production. The restriction on 
secondhand clothing was meant to be a coordinated effort by the members 
of the East African community, but Tanzania and others backed down in 
the face of US trade threats—a kind of free market mercantilism, where the 
United States uses its market power to extract trade concessions. Exports of 
secondhand clothes do generate thousands of jobs in the United States, but 
those to Rwanda account for only 0.003 percent of total US exports—around 
US$47 million a year (CGTN 2018). However, Rwanda exports only US$43 
million a year under AGOA (BBC 2018), and replacement markets have now 
been found in China.
Trump has a strong preference for bilateral trade deals over multiparty 
agreements (Gaffey 2017), as was highlighted at the 2017 US–Africa Business 
Summit in Washington, DC, where US Commerce Secretary Wilbur Ross 
proclaimed that US–Africa relations would transition from being aid-based 
to trade-based, with “two-way trade agreements being preferred to large 
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multilateral agreements” (Saldinger 2017).4 Thus, any hopes for revising 
AGOA to make it more conducive for African industrialization, such as 
helping build human and industrial capacity to produce goods for the United 
States seems to have to been shelved for now.
Africa’s global trading networks may become a casualty of Trump’s 
protectionist policies and trade wars with China and elsewhere.5 South 
Africa is on the list of countries that must pay sizable new duties on steel 
(25%) and aluminum (10%) exports to the United States (Wasserman 2018). 
The administration’s proposed tariffs on European vehicle imports (20%) 
could further hurt the country, as it exports approximately US$4 billion of 
automotive components to EU manufacturers (Martin 2018). Metalworking 
and manufacturing are vital to South Africa, with metalworking employ-
ing 21 percent of South Africa’s manufacturing workforce (Kohnert 2018; 
Statistics South Africa 2014). On the macro level, a continuation of the US 
trade war with China could spur a decline in the demand for commodities, 
the main driver of many African economies. The administration’s tariffs 
have provoked a targeted response from the Chinese government, includ-
ing a duty on American soybeans, which account for 41 percent of Chinese 
imports (Swanson 2018)—an area from which Ghana and other producers on 
the continent could benefit.
Development aid
Trump’s foreign policy can be described as promilitary and anti-aid (Lynch 
and De Luce 2017). Effects on Africa can manifest themselves indirectly 
through reduced support for international development organizations and/
or directly through US programs on the continent.
Official development assistance from the United States is substantially 
lower than the recommended 0.7 percent of GNP (OECD 2018). It contrib-
utes approximately US$8 billion worth of aid to Africa yearly (Reboredo 
2017). Trump’s reduction of US funding to the United Nations and affili-
ated agencies, by nearly $300 million a year (Helmore 2017), will drastically 
decrease that organization’s ability to fight hunger, disease, and war in Africa 
and elsewhere. Additionally, in a move reminiscent of the Bush era, the State 
Department has threatened to defund several organizations that specialize in 
family-planning services and reproductive health, under the claim that these 
operations violate a newly instituted antiabortion policy. To supplement 
these changes, the administration wanted to reinstate the so-called global 
gag rule, which “prevents any organization from providing abortion services, 
information, counseling, or referrals from receiving U.S. federal funding” 
(Sow 2017). Among these, the United Nations Population Fund provides 
child and maternal health services in 150 countries; however, the U.S Senate 
disagreed with the administration and voted against this (Mellen 2017).
Some observers fear that the Trump administration will cripple the 
capacity of the State Department and the US Agency for International 
Development (USAID) to deliver development assistance by failing to fill 
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important positions in these agencies and through budget cuts (Aleem 2018). 
For instance, the 2017 budget proposal that Trump submitted to Congress 
included a request to slash the State Department and the USAID budgets 
by about 30 percent and eliminate several agencies, including the African 
Development Foundation, which funds grassroots development projects in 
thirty African countries. The Office of Management and Budget estimates 
State Department outlays in 2023 as being 58 percent of what they were 
in 2017. The cuts are supposed partially to offset a $54 billion increase in 
defense spending (McCormick 2017). In addition to the cuts, the administra-
tion has failed to nominate replacements for hundreds of positions within 
the State Department—and prominent African countries, such as South 
Africa, Tanzania, and Sudan, so far lack ambassadorial appointments.
Another source of trepidation in the international development com-
munity is that the Trump administration may be less supportive of existing 
US development programs in Africa, even when it is impossible to abandon 
them in the short term. In other words, signature programs of previous 
administrations, such as MCA, AGOA, PEPFAR, and Obama’s Power Africa, 
may be facing malign neglect. For instance, though Trump has indicated 
his support for PEPFAR, his proposed cuts in State Department and USAID 
funding could affect programs that support the provision of critical services, 
poverty alleviation, health, education, emergency responses to disasters 
such as Ebola, and so forth (Beaumont 2018). Trump’s proposal to eliminate 
the USADF, which promotes development by investing in African enter-
prises, means that many development programs run by African partners 
would come to a halt overnight (Okeowo 2017a). Such lack of overt sup-
port could have a significant impact on African countries, given that US 
development aid to Africa, through programs such as AGOA and MCA, have 
become the main instruments for spreading ideas of economic liberaliza-
tion, governance or democracy, and human rights, though this may also 
open up policy space.
The administration’s new Africa strategy hints at a more strategic use 
of aid, which will be directed away from countries that do not align with 
Washington’s agenda. As Bolton noted: “countries that repeatedly vote against 
the United States in international forums, or take action counter to U.S. 
interests, should not receive generous American foreign aid” (White House 
2018b). Moreover, USAID has responded to recent criticisms from within and 
without through a shift toward what it terms enterprise driven development,6 
which will focus on market-based approaches as a way to foster African self-
sufficiency, as well as improve the efficiency of aid practices, representing a 
shift away from traditional government-to-government aid.
Us FDI to africa
Africa been experiencing increased FDI inflow in recent years, but the pat-
tern has been uneven, reflecting global uncertainty. According to Ernst 
and Young (2017), 2016 was the worst year for economic growth across 
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sub-Saharan Africa in more than twenty years. The total number of FDI 
projects in Africa was down 12.3 percent, and FDI-related jobs declined by 
13.1 percent, compared to 2015. However, capital investment into Africa 
rose 31.9 percent in 2016, and the continent’s share of global FDI capital 
flows increased to 11.4 percent, up from 9.4 percent in 2015.
Among the largest changes to US–African foreign policy in recent 
years is the passing of the Better Utilization of Investments Leading to 
Development act, and its subsequent creation of the US International 
Development Finance Corporation, which will have a spending cap of 
approximately $60 billion to invest in emerging markets worldwide. This 
institution will have a twenty-year authorization period and will absorb 
OPIC (the previous US development-finance corporation) and take on the 
role of USAID’s Development Credit Authority. It will be able to make 
equity investments, provide technical assistance, increase the availability 
of capital for investors by providing small grants and first-loss guarantees, 
and allow investors from other countries to use program mechanisms, so as 
to enlarge the US investment portfolio and soft power footprint (Runde and 
Bandura 2018).
In recent years, US investors have generally been more hesitant about 
investing in Africa than those from other regions, including Asia (Ernst and 
Young 2017). Nonetheless, the United States, remain the leading investor 
in Africa according to the number of projects; accounting for approximately 
13.5 percent of total FDI projects in 2016. The main targets for investment by 
US companies have included South Africa and northern Africa, particularly 
Morocco and Egypt (Gaffey 2017). However, the rate of investment from the 
United States has fallen recently, and in 2016, the total number of US proj-
ects in the continent declined by 5.6 percent, as “speculation that President 
Donald Trump’s foreign policy may be more insular than his immediate 
predecessor, is creating some uncertainty regarding the future of the US’ 
engagement with Africa” (Ernst and Young 2017, 19).
Sources of FDI into Africa are now more diversified, making the conti-
nent more resilient to the effects of external forces. For instance, investment 
from the Asia-Pacific region into Africa hit an all-time high in 2016 (Ernst 
and Young 2017, 18). This is notable, as 2016 saw a decline in investment 
from traditional partners like the United States and the United Kingdom. 
Asian countries accounted for more than a fifth of projects and more than 
half of capital investment, and companies from the region were the largest 
contributors to FDI jobs to Africa. It is therefore no surprise that in contrast 
to the decreased US FDI to Africa in 2016, the number of Chinese-funded 
projects increased by more than 100 percent and created more than 38,000 
jobs—more than three times as many as American investments (Gaffey 
2017). US officials, including Secretary of State Rex Tillerson, have roundly 
criticized Chinese investment in Africa, with Tillerson stating that Chinese 
funding “encourages dependency” and “when coupled with the political and 
fiscal pressure, endangers Africa’s natural resources and its long-term eco-
nomic and political stability” (Africa News 2018). Despite these warnings, 
FR
a
N
C
Is O
w
U
sU
, R
IC
a
R
D
O
 R
eb
O
R
eD
O
, Pá
D
R
a
Ig
 C
a
R
m
O
D
y
13
africa
To
D
A
y 66(1)
the administration’s America First rhetoric and its turn toward economic 
nationalism may make efforts to improve US economic ties with Africa more 
difficult and have detrimental effects on US foreign private investment to 
Africa by undermining confidence.
security or Terrorism
US engagement with Africa for addressing its security and terrorism chal-
lenges has a long history but was intensified after the coordinated terror-
ist incidents in the US on September 11, 2001 (Owusu 2007). US Africa 
Command (AFRICOM) was established in 2007 under President George W. 
Bush to serve as a unified command, responsible for engaging with African 
nations. The purpose was to develop long-term cooperative relationships and 
contingencies for managing international crises of mutual concern to the 
United States and African nations.7 In addition, the US military established 
an official base and dozens of small facilities and staging areas that collec-
tively host thousands of US troops (Allen 2018). President Bush described 
AFRICOM as an effort to bring peace and security to Africa and promote the 
goals of development, health, education, democracy, and economic growth 
in Africa (Dolanmay 2017). To him, it was “a humanitarian mission, . . . and 
we want to get it right” (quoted in Geldof 2008). However, humanitarianism 
and war are often mutually imbricated (Barnett 2011), with critics arguing 
that the United States has used AFRICOM as a front to run expansive and 
undocumented operations, including highly militarized operations in Soma-
lia against Al-Shabab, an Al-Qaeda affiliate (Dolanmay 2017). Nevertheless, 
the merger of humanitarianism and war as AFRICOM’s primary motivation 
faltered after the NATO bombardment of Libya in 2011, which President 
Obama later said was his biggest foreign policy regret.
President Trump’s pronouncements during the campaign and since 
coming to power indicate that security and terrorism are among his primary 
concerns. The highly militarized US presence in Africa, characterized by US 
bases and camps across the continent, may be intensified (Turse 2015). In 
a speech following a NATO summit, Trump proclaimed: “Africa right now 
has got problems that few people will even understand. . . . If you saw some 
of the things that I see through intelligence [of] what is going on in Africa, 
it is so sad, it is so vicious and violent, and we want peace, we want peace 
for Africa” (quoted in Adebayo 2018). Many Americans were surprised to 
learn, after some of their soldiers had been killed there, that American troops 
were in Niger in 2018. The opening of China’s first international military 
base in Djibouti only a few miles from US Camp Lemonnier is evidence of 
competition in Africa.8
The Trump administration’s highly contentious and contested travel 
ban includes three African countries and was panned by the African Union 
(Vanguard 2017), but the presence of terrorist groups, including Boko Haram 
and others, in parts of the continent could provide opportunities for closer 
cooperation with African governments.9 Islamist terror groups killed more 
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than 10,000 people in Africa in 2017, and the risk of terrorism in the United 
States may grow if these groups consolidate their holdings (Rosenthal 2018). 
The America First policy is in evidence when that country’s interests are 
felt to be directly threatened, so the pace of drone, air, and other strikes 
in Somalia against Al-Shabbab increased in 2017 to more than thirty-five 
(Okeowo 2017b; Serle and Purkiss, n.d.). From 2001 to 2016, the maximum 
number of reported US strikes in that country was less than fifty (Drones 
Team n.d.). Such an increase may generate resistance and attract recruits to 
groups like Al-Shabbab. Meanwhile, the number of special operation forces 
on the continent who could more accurately target terrorists is being reduced 
(Williams 2019).
Despite numerous terror threats on the continent, the Trump admin-
istration has been highly critical of UN peacekeeping missions, preferring 
unilateralism. UN peacekeeping supports 110,000 personnel (consisting 
of everything from troops to engineers and doctors) operating in fourteen 
separate missions, seven of which are based in Africa (Western Sahara, 
Abyei, Central African Republic, South Sudan, Democratic Republic of the 
Congo, Darfur, and Mali). The United States currently provides approxi-
mately 28 percent of total funding ($2.2 billion) for UN peacekeeping mis-
sions, though Nikki Haley, the former US ambassador to the UN, stated 
“there are places we can cut. . . . Everybody knows there’s fat at the UN. 
Everybody knows there’s fat in the peacekeeping missions” (Koran 2018). 
Since then, largely due to pressure from the administration, the UN cut 
nearly $600 million from its annual peacekeeping budget (Besheer 2017), 
yet despite the criticism, a newly released report by the US Government 
Accountability Office found that UN peacekeepers provide excellent value 
for the services they provide, noting that the UN’s $2.4 billion operation in 
the CAR would have cost $5.7 billion if undertaken by the US unilaterally. 
Additionally, the UN force exhibits greater international acceptance and 
legitimacy (GAO 2018).
The United States has roughly 6,000 troops stationed in Africa 
(Rosenthal 2018), and increasing militarization and securitization through-
out the continent, combined with Trump’s crude rhetoric and gaffes, could 
significantly harm US soft or smart power (Nye 2009), especially as African 
countries increasingly rely on states in Asia for trade and aid. A recent survey 
conducted throughout the continent by Afrobarometer (2016) shows that 
while the United States is still thought of as the best model for national 
development, China is close behind—30 percent to 26 percent, respectively. 
Additionally, Trump’s statements of support for authoritarian leaders such as 
Egypt’s General Abdel Fattah el-Sisi and Russia’s Vladimir Putin (Nordland 
2017) and his decision to withdraw from the UN Human Rights Council 
(Harris 2018) could harm US norm-forming abilities, as the traditional 
Western narrative about the US and China’s role in Africa has been a choice 
between US-led development via human rights versus Chinese-style authori-
tarianism (Mawdsley 2008).
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Climate Change
Another area where Trump’s views on global cooperation could affect Africa 
is climate change. African countries contribute only 3.8 percent of global 
greenhouse gas emissions, but they experience the worst of global warming. 
Temperatures are predicted to increase 2°C by the last two decades of this 
century—a scenario that would put more than half the continent’s popula-
tion at risk of undernourishment (United Nations 2015). In the near future, 
effects could include water shortages and stresses for 90 to 220 million 
people by 2020, increased rates of infectious tropical diseases, crop failures 
and food security issues, and more frequent extreme weather events (Golub-
ski 2017). Seven out of the world’s ten countries considered the most threat-
ened by climate change are in Africa (Bishop 2017), and extreme weather 
events are already taking a great toll on some rapidly growing African cities, 
threatening the livelihoods of millions (Dahir 2017).
During his campaign, Trump called global warming a hoax, and he 
said he would pull the United States out of the UN-sponsored Paris Climate 
Change Agreement when he could, in 2020. The agreement was signed by 195 
countries, including all fifty-five African ones. Trump has promised to “stop 
all payments of US tax dollars to UN global warming programs” (Yack 2017). 
Under the Paris accords, developed countries like the US are to contribute 
to a $100 billion annual fund for developing countries by 2020. Experts have 
advised African countries to develop clean energy systems, specifically wind 
and solar power, and vigorously to implement the Sustainable Development 
Goals (Munang and Mgendi 2017). To achieve this objective, African coun-
tries will need capital and expertise from developed countries, including the 
United States. Thus, the Trump administration’s decision to withdraw from 
the agreement will have significant negative effects on African states.
Concerns over climate change and security will likely be intertwined 
throughout the continent as rising temperatures contribute to an increase 
in conflict (Kuo 2016). The US military considers climate change a major 
security risk for this century (Johnson 2014), and experts have pointed out 
that a nexus of issues—food and water scarcity, ethnic and religious tensions, 
and migration—are at the center of the current crisis around the terrorist 
movement Boko Haram in Northern Nigeria, as Lake Chad has shrunk by 90 
percent, compromising many livelihoods in the region, as well as contribut-
ing to increased piracy off the Horn of Africa (Bhatiya 2017).
China and the United Kingdom: US Competitors in Africa
President Trump’s attempt to change the rules of the game for globaliza-
tion through his foreign policy are leading to selective US disengagement 
with Africa, combined with a disciplinary governmental and military 
gaze; however, this will have indirect effects. US competitors in Africa, 
especially China, are looking for ways to strengthen their relationships 
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with governments there. Indeed, China replaced the United States as 
Africa’s largest trading partner in 2009 and has hosted regular meetings 
between African ministers and their Chinese counterparts since 2000, 
including the triennial Forum on Africa–China Cooperation. Under the 
guise of South–South Cooperation, a concept whose rhetoric mirrors 
that of globalization (a win–win process, which will reorder global rela-
tions and create more equitable growth), Chinese investments in African 
countries have increased drastically, and many Africans are enjoying the 
benefits of Chinese-built roads, railways, airports, and so forth (Brigety 
2017). Working under the umbrella project One Belt, One Road, now 
renamed the Belt and Road Initiative (which builds on previous geoeco-
nomic endeavors, such as Go Out and Go West), a wide variety of Chinese 
enterprises, both state and privately owned, are undertaking projects in 
Africa. While largely an economic endeavor, aimed at reducing the effects 
of overaccumulation10 back home, the Belt and Road Initiative is an exer-
cise in power projection. Projects under its umbrella generally serve as 
catalysts for improved politico-economic relationships and characterize 
China’s flexible approach (in terms of funding modalities) to achieving its 
goals (Carmody and Taylor 2010). Indeed, a report by Ernst & Young (Lalor 
et al. 2017) indicated that since 2005, China has invested approximately 
$65 billion in 293 FDI projects, creating 130,750 jobs on the continent, 
though some of these will have displaced domestic firms’ production, so 
the net figure will be lower.
Whether the Belt and Road Initiative and Chinese investments as a 
whole can be used to change fundamentally Africa’s place within the global 
division of labor or induce large-scale industrialization partly depends on 
African governments themselves (Ziso 2018). Frequently unstable economic 
and security environments, combined with massive infrastructural deficits, 
can deter investment, while corruption, capital extraction, and white-ele-
phant projects can squander gains quickly, though counterexamples exist, 
such as Ethiopia, which has been successfully industrializing in recent 
years (Oqubay 2015). Additionally, some have criticized China’s initia-
tives as being one-way streets, exporting the country’s project and banking 
models without reciprocal openings of its capital or consumer markets. As 
Kenderdine (2017) notes: 
China’s trade and investment strategy abroad is the practical 
industrial policy matrix through which its local industries, 
local governments[,] and policy banks are to intersect with 
partner economies as part of the wider belt and road trade 
strategy. However, this combination of policy bank loans and 
industrial overcapacity export is effectively China offshoring 
its local debt problem to unwitting trading partners.
Equitable growth will largely depend on local policies and the creation of 
productive networks and assemblages.
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In addition to China, other countries will be happy to fill any void that 
will allow them access to Africa’s markets and resources (Carmody 2016). 
Britain’s hope to boost trade with Africa by building a so-called Empire 
2.0 is an example of such efforts. This ambitious, though poorly articu-
lated, agenda for a series of new trade agreements with Commonwealth 
countries was a major talking point among leave campaigners, who framed 
the European Union’s Economic Partnership Agreements as being harm-
ful to the UK’s interests because of their supposed cumbersomeness and 
parochialism (Murray-Evans 2016). These agreements were said to con-
strain the UK’s ability to create liberal trade agreements. While the exact 
shape of Brexit remains unclear, a shift toward an aid or development 
policy based largely on national interest and the search for investment 
opportunities is openly mooted (Langan 2016; Price 2016). This narrative 
downplays Britain’s relative economic decline throughout the latter 20th 
century and the agency of both African and Commonwealth states, yet 
as Murray-Evans (2016) notes, it was widespread resistance from African 
states, rather than intra-EU disagreements or protectionism, that led to 
difficulties with the current EU trade liberalization agenda under the 
Cotonou Agreement.
As currently constructed, EU trade agreements with African, 
Caribbean, and Pacific countries essentially collectivize responsibilities for 
the continents’ former colonies through instruments such as the European 
Development Fund. Brexit will require a fundamental reformulation of 
the UK’s trade relations with Commonwealth states (Price 2016). Patrick 
Gomes, Secretary-General of the African, Caribbean, and Pacific Group of 
States, maintains that any new trade deal would require “a transition period 
of at least six years,” as any fewer would introduce market uncertainty in an 
abrupt and destabilizing manner. He derides the Empire 2.0 trade strategy: 
“This is in our view reactionary, trying to recreate what we’ve gone beyond” 
(quoted in Neslen 2017).
Several UK members of Parliament have spoken at length about the 
need to create a prodevelopment trade policy, one that dismantles nontariff 
barriers and eases protective subsidies for UK farmers, though these ideas 
remain at odds with the current stated plans of the UK’s Conservative Party 
(Langan 2016). Replicating the current EU model would reproduce its extant 
problems, while seeking more ambitious liberalization agreements would 
be difficult, given preexisting African apprehensions and the UK’s small 
market size. For Africa, Brexit could further complicate a delicate economic 
situation, characterized by reduced commodity prices and higher external 
borrowing costs (Sow and Sy 2016). States that rely on the UK may be hit 
hard; scholars from North-West University have presented evidence that 
Brexit could cause South Africa’s GDP growth to fall by 0.1 percent; how-
ever, Brexit could create opportunities for more favorable agreements for 
the continent, reflecting the need for renegotiating existing arrangements 
(ICTSD 2016).
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Conclusion
Africa, as a whole, has arguably suffered from globalization (Bond 2006), but 
as we have demonstrated, the implication of US-led renegotiated globaliza-
tion for Africa could be even more negative. A trade war between the United 
States and China, as well as with the EU and other countries, if it escalates, 
could reduce global growth, depressing commodity prices and negatively 
affecting many African countries.
Part of the Trump administration’s approach toward Africa can be 
characterized as one of selective delinking, itself composed of a three-track 
strategy: of disengagement by design, through cutbacks in aid for instance; 
of disengagement by neglect, by not committing to an early renewal or 
extension of AGOA; and of disciplinary governmentality via leveraging aid, 
market access, and military axes. The approach can be considered coercive 
governmentality, evidenced by the shift from multilateral and regional 
agreements to transactional, bilateral engagement. The United States will 
continue to practice conditional support and insist on reciprocity, but will 
likely be more hostile toward countries it characterizes as opposing its inter-
ests. Additionally, with the new Africa strategy, aid will likely join trade as 
a strategic tool.
Other dimensions of the Trump administration’s America First policy 
that could affect Africa are not discussed here. For instance, the global crack-
down on immigration could significantly affect African countries’ reliance 
on remittances as tools for economic development and poverty allevia-
tion (World Bank 2017a). Similarly, the effects of possibly weakening the 
European Union on Africa’s own experiment with regional integration are 
yet to be seen, with some already calling for disbanding the African Union 
(Ayittey 2016).
Geopolitical competition opens up policy space for African elites, but 
some have argued that with the BRI, China is losing interest in the continent 
in favor of the more economically important Europe and the Middle East 
(ChinaAfrica Project 2017). A critical question is whether Africa can take 
advantage of the emerging economic and geopolitical environments and turn 
them to its advantage,11 but as shown here, this may be difficult. Of the Four 
P’s (Bruce Jentleson, cited in Kalu 2014), meant to inform US policy toward 
Africa, power is currently trumping peace, prosperity, and principles.
NOTes
1. Interestingly and in contrast, Peter Navarro, one of the president’s main economic advisors, 
devotes considerable attention to africa in his books to show the malign influence of China 
on the continent (Navarro 2007; Navarro and autry 2011).
2. governmentality here refers to activities designed to shape, guide, or affect the conduct of 
the governments and people africa.
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3. The africa strategy factsheet published by the white House similarly paints agOa in a posi-
tive light.
4. This has since been entrenched via the new africa strategy.
5. The initial months of Trump’s presidency seemed to show a shift from an emphasis on geoeco-
nomics to geopolitics in relations with China, with Trump saying he would not label China a 
currency manipulator because it was being cooperative over North Korea; however, as Chinese 
trade with North Korea expanded, Trump’s rhetoric shifted back to something closer to that 
expressed in his preelection book, which called China an enemy (Trump 2017). Of course, 
having a polyphonic discourse may be an aspect of the art of the deal (Trump and schwartz 
2016), by which one unnerves one’s opponent, and Trump had previously said he wanted to 
be unpredictable with China.
6. It is important to note that the agency’s shift toward the private sector began under the 
previous administration.
7. according to the aFRICOm website (https://www.africom.mil/), it “disrupts and neutralizes 
transnational threats, protects U.s. personnel and facilities, prevents and mitigates conflict, 
and builds african partner defense capability and capacity in order to promote regional 
security, stability, and prosperity.”
8. lemonnier and Djibouti are strategically located on the bab el-mandeb strait, a gateway to 
egypt’s suez Canal, one of the world’s busiest shipping corridors. They are close to areas of sig-
nificant Us engagement, including somalia, and a short distance from the arabian Peninsula, 
including yemen (woody 2017).
9. Trump’s first phone calls to african leaders were to President muhammadu buhari of Nigeria 
and Jacob Zuma of south africa. It is reported that security was one of the main topics 
discussed, with Trump pledging his support for the sale of Us aircraft to support Nigeria’s 
fight against boko Haram (white House press release, https://www.whitehouse.gov/the 
-press-office/2017/02/15/readout-presidents-call-president-muhammadu-buhari-nigeria).
10. This refers to the tendency of firms to try to keep wages as low as possible, increasing pro-
duction but reducing the potential market for products. For example, as workers in iPhone 
assembly factories cannot afford to buy iPhones, profits must be invested in other, often 
nonproductive, assets, such as stocks and real estate.
11. In many ways, africa is not an actor, in the sense of african governments acting in the general 
interest of their populations to improve living standards; rather, africa is relationally produced 
through its interactions with other places.
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